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Abstract 
As the World Wide Web grows, the number and variety of deceptive attacks targeting online 
consumers likewise increases. Extant research has examined online deception from an 
information processing perspective, that is, how users process information when they 
encounter deceptive attacks. However, users’ ability to process information is based on what 
the users are thinking or their frame of mind while engaged with that information. Frame of 
mind has not been well studied in the security domain. This study proposes the effect of 
users’ frame of mind on their attitude towards online deception and their actual deception 
detection behaviour. Specifically, we propose that human information needs and the framing 
(positive or negative) of important information such as warnings are significant components 
of users’ frames of mind that impact their vulnerability to online attacks. We conclude the 
paper by discussing in detail the experimental setup and expected contributions from the 
analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Cybercrime is a growing and unsolved phenomenon which continues to cause significant 
costs to both individuals and organizations. It is estimated that 65% of people using the 
Internet have been subjected to some form of cybercrime (Norton, 2010). The annual 
turnover of the global cybercrime industry is estimated at US$ 1 trillion (Kshetri, 2010; 
Menn, 2010). Most modern cybercrime does not rely wholly on technological mechanisms to 
overcome security systems.  Instead, it relies mostly on human behaviour (Townsend, 2010). 
Thus, modern computer security relies on users to make the correct decisions when faced 
with a cyber-attack. Unfortunately, extant research tells us that users often make poor 
decisions when faced with cyber-attacks (Ekman, 2009). 
Most research that examines users’ ability to detect online deception leverages on the 
mechanics of human information processing (Biros, George, & Zmud, 2002; Burgoon & 
Buller, 1996; Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal, & Glen Berryman, 2001). One underexplored, but 
likely predictor of human information processing (and therefore a user’s ability to detect 
online deception), is a user’s frame of mind. This, in turn, can be affected by the activity the 
user is performing. As an analogy, consider how a user’s frame of mind influences driving 
safety. Substantial research has shown that other activities the user is performing while 
driving such as making or receiving a mobile phone call or using a hands-free device impacts 
driving safety performance (Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997). Accordingly, the distracted 
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frame of mind compromises driving safety. In the same way, we argue the user’s 
vulnerability to online attacks depends directly on the user’s frame of mind while performing 
tasks.  
Online users engage with different kinds of web applications to cater to their multitude of 
information needs. Accordingly, users’ specific frame of mind has an effect on the kind of 
information that users are in need of and the methodology employed to seek for it. For 
example, if a person is looking for a very specific piece of information, the person will 
probably use a search engine. In contrast, if this person is not looking for anything specific, 
but is willing to serendipitously discover information, the person might just spend time 
browsing a newsgroup or forum. Finally, users of email and social networks are not looking 
for anything specific but are constantly monitoring their accounts to find useful information. 
Another factor that affects the user’s frame of mind is whether the user views an information 
source as suspicious or not (e.g., the user has been warned).  
Leveraging on research on human information behaviour, we argue that the particular activity 
users perform influences their frame of mind, thereby making them more or less vulnerable to 
attacks. Our paper proposes contribution to research in three ways. First, our paper proposes 
that users engaged in active seeking (e.g., searching the web) are more vulnerable to cyber-
attacks than users engaged in non-directed monitoring (e.g., browsing forums), who are in 
turn more vulnerable than those engaged in active scanning (e.g., reading email). 
Furthermore, we also propose that users who are warned are less vulnerable than users who 
are not.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give a brief overview of the 
background literature on online deception. We then build our argument towards the frame of 
mind concept, leveraging on the information seeking and security awareness literature. In the 
following section we present our research model and supporting arguments for the 
hypotheses. Next, we discuss the experiment and the procedures involved along with 
information about the sample. We then discuss the analysis method that will be used for the 
study and conclude with expected contributions. 
 
2. Background & Prior Literature 
It is widely accepted that humans are the weakest links in any security infrastructure (Mitnick 
& Simon, 2003). This has prompted many IS security researchers to study the phenomenon of 
human behaviour and decision-making ability in the light of security attacks. The majority of 
such studies find that humans, even experienced ones, are poor detectors of deception 
(Ekman, 2009; Stefano Grazioli, 2004; S. Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2000). Most of such studies 
have adopted a view that when users encounter any information-laden stimulus, they process 
or interpret information in the stimulus to make decisions about the credibility of the 
information. For example, interpersonal deception theory suggests that users process both 
verbal and non-verbal cues to make decisions about the credibility of the communicator 
(Burgoon & Buller, 1996). In the case of a cyber-attack, the stimulus is usually the deceptive 
information embedded in the attack. Users often engage and seek for such stimuli as they 
may contain information of value or interest.  
Similarly, the theory of deception posits that most users follow a cognitive link or path that 
enables them to make judgements about the credibility of a stimulus that they are exposed to 
(Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal, & Zualkernan, 1992). Users base these judgements on similarities 
to either previous experience, or their inherent or trained technical ability. For example, some 
users interpret assurance mechanisms such as certificates, seals or testimonials as cues for 
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credibility based on their previous experiences (Chang, Cheung, & Tang, 2013; S. Grazioli & 
Jarvenpaa, 2000; Kim & Benbasat, 2006).Others process or interpret structural attributes of 
the stimulus and the information embedded within based on their inherent or acquired 
expertise (Jakobsson, Tsow, Shah, Blevis, & Lim, 2007; Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, & 
Rao, 2011). Research on phishing has shown cues such as source of the email, grammar, 
spelling and title as salient factors in detecting phishing attacks (Vishwanath et al., 2011). 
Other studies suggest factors such as risk propensity, self-efficacy, personal knowledge and 
level of involvement are correlated with deception detection accuracy (Chen, Wang, Herath, 
& Rao, 2011; Vishwanath et al., 2011). Individual factors hypothesized to affect phishing 
detection accuracy include gender (Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006), and personality traits 
such as commitment, trust and fear (Workman, 2008a). Underlying these factors is the idea 
that people process information to detect deception.  
However, how people process information depends partly on their frame of mind. For 
example, it is widely recognized that users who are put into a cautious frame are less likely to 
be victimized by security attacks than those who are not (Biros et al., 2002; George, Marett, 
& Tilley, 2004). While this is recognized, most research does not take frame of mind into 
account when examining the empirical evidence.  
2.1 Frame of Mind 
There is plenty of research demonstrating that users’ frames of mind impact their 
performance. As a simple illustration, the level of stress the user feels impacts performance 
(Mann, 2010). Furthermore, the activity a user performs directly impacts their frame of mind. 
For example, people on a mobile phone are distracted, and drivers who are in a distracted 
frame are four times more likely to have an accident (Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997). 
This research attempts to test if the user’s frame of mind impacts their deception detection 
ability. There are, of course, multiple ways to alter a user’s frame of mind. In this research, 
we manipulate users’ (1) need for information and (2) security consciousness. 
2.1.1 Need for information 
Most studies on security-related deception employ the context of email use and phishing 
(Jakobsson et al., 2007; Vishwanath et al., 2011; J. Wang, Chen, Herath, & Rao, 2009; 
Workman, 2008b).  However, the majority of users spend time on the Internet on application 
types other than email. The question thus arises as to whether users engaged with web 
applications other than email are in a frame of mind different from users using email and 
hence are more or less vulnerable to security attacks. For example, a user’s frame of mind 
when using a search engine is entirely different from that when he/she checks email or 
browses the web. It has been shown that users’ need for information has an effect on their 
information processing and use patterns (Byström & Järvelin, 1995; Case, 2012). Thus, 
willingness to trust and use information will vary based on users’ frames of mind when they 
seek information. However, there is little research that investigates this phenomenon. To 
understand how frame of mind impacts application use we turn to research on information 
seeking behaviour.  
Information seeking behaviour is the purposive seeking of information to satisfy a specific 
goal (T. D. Wilson, 2000). The nature of this goal influences the user’s frame of mind and 
defines relevant search behaviour, for example, whether to use automated information 
systems such as search engines or manual systems such as an online catalogue. Prior research 
argues there are three different types of frames in which the user is directly involved in 
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sourcing information – (1) Active seeking (2) Active scanning, and (3) Non-directed 
monitoring (Choo, Detlor, & Turnbull, 1998; McKenzie, 2003).  
 Active seeking occurs when users look for information based on an already identified 
need or knowledge gap and perform a systematic search. The search process ends 
when the identified knowledge gap is filled. For example, a user employs a search 
engine to find a specific piece of information. 
 Active scanning occurs when users’ search processes are constrained to an already 
identified specific information-rich source. In active scanning, users do not have a 
specific goal or need in mind but are constantly aware of the possibility of finding 
useful new information. For example, users monitor their email or social networks 
regularly.  
 Non-directed monitoring occurs when users serendipitously find information in an 
unlikely place; users do not have any goal in mind but their information need is 
triggered when they are exposed to useful information. On the Internet this would be 
the equivalent of finding an interesting article or video while browsing aimlessly from 
one website to another. 
Consistent with the literature, we consider that users, subject to their information need, seek 
information by engaging in any of the three frames  (Choo et al., 1998). However, each frame 
causes users to manifest a unique behaviour that in turn influences their processing abilities 
(Case, 2012).   
2.1.2 Security consciousness 
Another factor that affects users’ frame of mind while using the Internet is the information 
already possessed by them. For example, research on framing effects demonstrates that 
depending upon how information is presented, users can be manipulated to make different 
decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The literature points to three types of framing 
effects – (1) Attribute framing, (2) Risky choice framing and (3) Goal framing (Levin, 
Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). In attribute framing, a single attribute of an object is the target of 
manipulation and is presented in an either positive or negative frame. When such a framing 
occurs, objects with a positive frame generally evaluate better than ones with a negative 
frame. In risky choice framing, usually only two options are presented to choose from – (a) a 
safe choice and (b) a risky gamble. Depending upon whether each choice is presented as a 
gain or a loss, users choose the safer or riskier option respectively (Tversky, Kahneman, & 
Choice, 1981). Finally, in goal framing users are usually encouraged to engage in some form 
of goal oriented activity. In doing so, information is presented in terms of the advantages of 
participating versus the disadvantages of not participating. In such cases, messages eliciting 
the negative consequences of not participating have been found to fare better in influencing 
participation (Levin et al., 1998).  
The use of message framing to influence user behaviour is well documented in the literature. 
For example, in the marketing literature, the framing effects phenomenon  is used to 
understand the effectiveness of product warning messages (e.g., on alcohol and cigarette 
packages) (Kelley, Gaidis, & Reingen, 1989; Strahan et al., 2002). In information systems, 
the effect of positive or negative frames has been explored to study IT adoption (Angst & 
Agarwal, 2009; Bhattacherjee & Sanford, 2006). In the context of information security, this 
has been demonstrated in testing the effects of warning on users’ awareness of security issues 
(Biros et al., 2002; George et al., 2004; Stefano Grazioli, 2004). Accordingly, this study uses 
the concept of warning as a proxy for users’ awareness or consciousness of security issues.  
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Whether or not users receive a warning about potential deception impacts their frame of mind 
by making them more suspicious. It has been established that when users’ suspicion levels 
are aroused, they are better at detecting deception and that warnings are capable of arousing 
suspicion (Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1992). However, not all studies of deception find a positive 
link between warning and deception detection performance (Stefano Grazioli & Wang, 2001; 
Marett & George, 2005). This discrepancy may be because most studies focus only on the 
presence or absence of a warning. Very few studies have explored the effect of the content of 
the warning. Accordingly, we draw ideas from the literature on framing effects and use both 
positively framed warning that highlights the consequential gains of adopting a particular 
behaviour, and negatively framed warning that highlights the consequential losses and test 
their effects on users’ deception detection behaviour. 
3. Proposed research model and Hypotheses 
Based on the literature presented above, we present our research model as Figure 1 below. 
The two exogenous constructs are Information Seeking and Warning that together represent 
our ‘frame of mind’ concept. There are two endogenous constructs – (1) Attitude towards 
deception detection and (2) Deception detection behaviour. Attitude is defined as “a 
psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree 
of favour or disfavour” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In this paper, we aim to measure users’ 
general tendencies toward the threat of online deception. Users have a favourable attitude 
towards deception detection if they believe online deception exists and an unfavourable 
attitude if they believe no threat exists. Deception detection behaviour is the actual detection 
behaviour that users exhibit when exposed to online attacks. By comparing users’ perceived 
attitude against their actual behaviour, we hope to generate unique insights about how online 
users make decisions in the face of deception. We present our arguments for our hypotheses 
below.  
 
Figure 1: Research model 
 
H2 a-b-c 
H3 
a-b-c 
H5 
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3.1 Effect of Information Seeking Frames 
Active seeking. We argue that of the three information seeking frames – active scanning, 
active seeking and non-directed monitoring, users who actively seek information are the least 
likely to detect online attacks. Active seeking of information is a behaviour exhibited by 
individuals when they experience a gap in knowledge about a specific topic (T. D. Wilson, 
1999). This leads them to carry out a systematic and pre-planned search effort to fill the 
knowledge gap. However, as the goal is knowledge acquisition, user behaviour is subject to 
the principle of least effort (Zipf, 1949); humans have a tendency to choose and use easily 
available information without considering the quality and reliability of the information 
(Bates, 2003). Methodologies that decrease the effort of information acquisition reduce 
reliance on the quality of information as a criterion (Hertzum, Andersen, Andersen, & 
Hansen, 2002; King, Casto, & Jones, 1994) .  
 
Users engaged in the active seeking frame often use recommendation agents or search 
engines. Such systems reduce the effort of information acquisition and help users to easily 
make relevant decisions. However, the degree that such systems help the customer in 
decision making depends on the objective of the person who controls the system (Hill, King, 
& Cohen, 1996). A study of personal recommendation agents (PRA) demonstrated that 
deceptive PRAs can have a significant effect on product choice to users’ detriment (Xiao, 
2010). With the explosive growth of content on the web, it is increasingly becoming 
necessary to find information quickly and accurately. This makes users highly vulnerable to 
attacks such as search engine poisoning (Townsend, 2010). Accordingly, relative to the other 
two frames, we expect that users engaged in active seeking will be the most vulnerable to 
online attacks. Hence: 
 
H1a: Of the three frames, Active seeking, Active scanning & Non-directed 
monitoring, users who are engaged in the Active Seeking frame will have the least 
favourable attitude towards detecting attacks. 
 
Similarly, 
 
H2a: Of the three frames, Active seeking, Active scanning & Non-directed 
monitoring, users who are engaged in the Active Seeking frame will be the worst 
detectors of deception. 
Active scanning. When users perform active scanning, they often engage in ritualistic or 
habitual behaviour (Rubin, 1994) and place themselves in environments which are known to 
be information rich. Prior positive experiences drive users to revisit such information sources 
(McKenzie, 2003). Users of email and social networks are example cases of users engaged in 
active scanning.  
When compared to active seeking and non-directed monitoring, we argue that users engaged 
in active scanning are the least vulnerable. Users in an active scanning frame of mind initially 
apply some effort in differentiating between different information rich sources before 
choosing a specific choice of source (Choo et al., 1998). Once they have chosen a source, for 
example, a specific social network or email, they build a mental profile of expected 
behaviours. Deviations from expected behaviour are treated with suspicion. Also, a lot of 
public awareness about attacks relevant to this frame, such as phishing and email spam, 
exists. Thus, users are generally more vigilant when consuming information in this frame of 
mind (Ivaturi & Janczewski, 2012). Accordingly, users engaged in active scanning are 
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relatively better at detecting deception than users in the other two frames of mind. Hence: 
 
H1b: Of the three frames, Active seeking, Active scanning & Non-directed monitoring, 
users who are engaged in the Active Scanning frame will have the most favourable 
attitude towards detecting attacks. 
 
H2b: Of the three frames, Active seeking, Active scanning & Non-directed monitoring, 
users who are engaged in the Active Scanning frame will be the best detectors of 
deception. 
Non-directed monitoring. We argue that users engaged in a non-directed monitoring frame 
are more likely to detect deception than users in an active seeking frame but less likely than 
users in an active scanning frame of mind. Users in this frame are usually not aware of the 
need for information until they encounter it. This behaviour corresponds to Wilson’s (1999) 
passive attention, Choo et al.’s (1998) undirected viewing and Ross’s (1999) finding without 
seeking. Toms (2000) describes this process as serendipitous information seeking where users 
only recognize the usefulness of information when the information is encountered. 
Essentially, in this frame of mind, users have no a priori intent of finding information and so 
the behaviour is not driven by speed as it is for active seeking users.   
Users in this frame usually scan large chunks of information from varied sources until 
something catches their attention. They do not scan the whole information horizon in a single 
movement but rather take a glimpse, look further at things that might interest them and then 
take another glimpse (Kwasnik, 1992). During this iterative process of ‘discovery’ and 
‘consumption’, users tend not to have time to judge the quality or credibility of the content. 
They hence use heuristic shortcuts  instead of carefully processing information which makes 
them more vulnerable to deception (Chaiken, 1980). Also, the sense of curiosity or joy of 
‘discovery’ associated with this frame triggers a need for information that lowers users’ level 
of care and attention, consequently leading to low levels of deception detection. Hence, users 
in this frame of mind are more vulnerable than active scanning users who are relatively less 
accustomed to this sense of ‘discovery’. Thus:  
 
H1c: Users who are in the Non-directed monitoring frame of mind will have a more 
favourable attitude towards detecting attacks than users engaged in Active seeking 
when compared to users in the Active scanning frame of mind. 
 
H2c: Users who are engaged in the Non-directed monitoring frame of mind will be 
better detectors of deception than users engaged in Active seeking when compared to 
users in the Active scanning frame of mind. 
3.2 Effect of Warning and Warning Frames 
Extant research has shown that training and warning are broadly the two major counter attack 
mechanisms through which users can enhance their deception detection performance. 
Training is a formal way of building relevant and necessary security skills and competencies 
and hence it contributes to better performance in identifying anomalies (M. Wilson, Stine, & 
Bowen, 2009). However, it is not feasible to provide such training to everyone using the web. 
Warnings, on the other hand, contribute to better deception detection performance by 
inducing suspicion about the credibility of information.   
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Prior research reveals that individuals perform better at deception detection when their 
suspicion is aroused (Biros et al., 2002; Stiff et al., 1992). Explicit warnings about potential 
deception have the ability to raise suspicion. Hence, people who are given a warning are 
much better prepared than people who are not given a warning.  
However, prior (non-security) research has shown that the way the message is framed has an 
effect on users’ decision making abilities. Accordingly, it is useful to think about the content 
or framing of the warning which can in turn impact detection accuracy. Research on framing 
effects tells us that for behaviours that involve some level of risk or unpleasant outcomes, 
negatively framed messages that emphasize losses fare better than positively framed 
messages that focus on the gains (Rothman, Bartels, Wlaschin, & Salovey, 2006). As being 
victimized by an online attack can be considered as a high risk outcome and in line with the 
above argument, we propose that: 
H3: Users who are given a negatively framed warning will have the most, users who 
are given no warning will have the worst and users who are given a positively framed 
warning will have a moderately favourable attitude towards deception.  
 
H4: Users who are given a negatively framed warning will have the best, users who 
are given no warning will have the worst and users who are given a positively framed 
warning will have moderate deception detection behaviour. 
3.3 Deception Detection Behaviour 
Finally, we explore whether users’ attitude towards detecting attacks has an influence on their 
actual deception detection behaviour. The positive influence of users’ attitude on users’ 
eventual behaviour via users’ intentions is well established in the literature (Ajzen, 1991; 
Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). This relationship has also been tested in the context of adoption and 
use of IT in different contexts and across cultures (Davis, 1989; Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & 
Davis, 2003). Accordingly, 
 
H5: Users’ attitude towards deception detection is positively related to their actual 
deception detection behaviour 
4. Methodology 
Hypotheses will be tested through a quasi-experiment conducted in a laboratory setting 
(Cook, Campbell, & Day, 1979). The experiment will use a repeated measures design that 
expose subjects to three simulated online attacks relevant to the three information seeking 
frames. The quasi-experiment will comprise of an experimental task phase and a post-
experimental phase.  
 
Sample. Subjects will be undergraduate students of a large business school. The literature 
supports the use of business students as a representative sample for experimental studies in 
IS, especially when the target population is that of typical Internet users (Dickson, Senn, & 
Chervany, 1977; Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 2003). Also, benchmark studies such as the 
Pew Internet project indicate that users who spend the most time on the Internet are in the 
same age bracket as university students (Pew, 2012).  Subjects will be recruited through an 
advertisement. There will be a monetary incentive to motivate potential subjects to take part 
in the experiment. We expect to recruit around 100 students and as we are using a repeated 
measures design our effective sample size will be 300 (with three tasks assigned per subject).  
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4.1 Experimental Procedure 
4.1.1 Pre-experimental phase 
In this phase, subjects will be asked to complete a survey that collects information about 
users’ age groups and gender. Also, subjects will be briefed about the nature of the task and 
time frame involved in participating in the experiment.  
 
4.1.2 Experimental task phase 
 During this phase, subjects will be directed to a website where they will be given three 
treatments in a random order. The process for each treatment will be similar. Subjects will 
first be given a set of instructions to complete each treatment task. Each treatment will 
simulate the “typical” experience of a user engaged in each of the three information seeking 
frames discussed earlier.  
For the active seeking treatment, subjects will be asked to find answers to hypothetical 
questions using a custom search engine. This task replicates user behaviour while engaged in 
an active seeking frame. The search results will be manipulated to mimic a search engine 
poisoning attack – the most prominent attack method to affect users of search engines 
(Howard & Komili, 2010; John, Yu, Xie, Krishnamurthy, & Abadi, 2011). Specifically, the 
search engine would query Microsoft Bing, and return Bing results. However, a random 30% 
of the results will be replaced by dummy URLs irrelevant to users’ original queries. The 
manipulations will include a mismatch between the displayed URL and the destination URL 
and changes to the description of the search result snippet. These manipulations are in line 
with standard search engine poisoning attacks. A ratio of the number of clicks on 
manipulated results over the total number of clicks was taken as an aggregate measure of 
users’ deception detection behaviour. 
For the active scanning treatment, subjects will be asked to login to an email account created 
for the study. Subjects will be told to treat the email inbox as their own and take any 
appropriate action. Each subject will receive a unique email account to make it easier for the 
researchers to track individual behaviour. Some of the emails in this treatment will be crafted 
as phishing emails. Again, the ratio of the number of clicks on manipulated links in the 
phishing emails over the total number of clicks on links across all the emails will be taken as 
the aggregate measure. 
 For non-directed monitoring, subjects will be asked to browse a news portal that will provide 
three categories of news articles – business, sports and entertainment. The instructions will be 
to spend time browsing the three categories and to identify one article per category that users 
find most useful and interesting. This task replicates the exploratory nature of non-directed 
monitoring. All user clicks on the news portal will be recorded and a ratio of the number of 
clicks on manipulated links over the total number of clicks will be calculated to represent 
individual subjects’ deception detection rate. 
All subjects will be kept ignorant of the real nature of the study. 1/3
rd
 of subjects will be 
treated with a negatively framed warning, and 1/3
rd
 with a positively framed warning. The 
rest will not receive any warning.  
4.1.3 Post-experimental phase 
Once the three tasks are completed, subjects will be directed to the post-experimental survey 
that measures users’ attitude towards deception. The items used for the study will be adapted 
from the literature as a 7-point semantic differential scale with polar adjectives (Jingguo 
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Wang, Chaudhury, & Rao, 2008). Example polar adjectives used are extremely foolish-
extremely wise and extremely risky-extremely safe. 
 
5. Analysis 
In order to understand the effect of different contexts of information seeking and warning 
frames, tests for group differences will be carried out. ANOVA tests are simple yet powerful 
and are used to test the effect of a manipulation variable on the dependent variable in an 
experimental study. In fact, as there are multiple dependent variables (attitude and deception 
behaviour) we will use a MANOVA in order to test for the group differences.  
 
6. Conclusion and Expected contributions 
This study is meant to provide several contributions to both academics and practitioners. 
From the theoretical perspective, this research makes important contributions to the user 
deception detection literature. As far as we know, this is the first study in IS security domain 
that considers the heterogeneous nature of user vulnerability by testing the effect of various 
user contexts of information seeking as a predictor for user vulnerabilities. From a 
practitioner’s perspective, this study offers empirical evidence that trainings and awareness 
programmes should go beyond the traditional anti-phishing trainings to include information 
about emerging attacks such as search engine poisoning. 
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